Scivillage.com Casual Discussion Science Forum

https://medium.com/unified-theory-of-kno...4742162fd5

"We are scientists. We believe that there is only one world, the natural world. We also believe in the power of the scientific enterprise to yield deep truths about the nature of the universe that transcend the knowledge of “local” cultures.

We believe in a deep ontological continuity across the stack of complexification. We believe science has traced that ontological continuity in a convincing manner, both “back” to the origins of our observable universe at the Big Bang and “down” into molecules and atoms into particles and, finally, quantum fields.

And we believe that psychology and cognitive science should be consistent with biology which, in turn, should be consistent with chemistry which should be consistent with physics. We also believe in the causal closure of physics and that everything that is real ultimately “supervenes” on the physical.

And, yet, despite all these assertions and commitments, we reject the label physicalism (as well as materialism) to describe our views.

Instead, we are ontological naturalists. More specifically, we are Extended Naturalists (EN). As we have laid out in the Cognitive Science Show Transcendent Naturalism, EN is a new philosophy of mind and science. To see why we reject the label physicalism, we need to zoom out and see the current state of our knowledge and consider how we got here..."
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I respect that EN seeks to complexify it's scientific worldview beyond the binary of physical vs mental of physicalism, being open to a broader or multi-layered ontology that actually includes information, life, culture, and the mind. Metaphysically speaking it bears a resemblance to pluralism. Will it solve the Hard problem though? Time will tell..

"Metaphysical pluralism is the philosophical doctrine that reality is composed of multiple, distinct, and irreducible substances, types of being, or fundamental truths, rather than a single unified substance (monism). It posits that the universe is a "many" rather than a "one," often including diverse categories like matter, mind, space, time, and value."

(Mar 20, 2026 07:25 PM)Magical Realist Wrote: [ -> ]https://medium.com/unified-theory-of-kno...4742162fd5

[...] And, yet, despite all these assertions and commitments, we reject the label physicalism (as well as materialism) to describe our views.

Instead, we are ontological naturalists. More specifically, we are Extended Naturalists (EN). As we have laid out in the Cognitive Science Show Transcendent Naturalism, EN is a new philosophy of mind and science. To see why we reject the label physicalism, we need to zoom out and see the current state of our knowledge and consider how we got here..."

I respect that EN seeks to complexify it's scientific worldview beyond the binary of physical vs mental of physicalism, being open to a broader or multi-layered ontology that actually includes information and the mind. Will it solve the Hard problem though? Time will tell..

https://iili.io/qOyRLe1.webp

Apparently built on liberal naturalism.

A New Approach to Naturalism
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/...naturalism

KEY POINTS: Traditional physicalism claims everything "real" must be reducible to physics and chemistry. Liberal naturalism accepts natural explanations while treating human experiences as genuinely real. Extended naturalism unifies objective science with subjective experience in one natural worldview.

Naturalism was originally open to multiple metaphysical propositions potentially filling its placeholder. And it even seemed to have phenomenalism as the starting point of its epistemic enterprise. But at some point in the 20th-century, it dogmatically shifted for the most part to physicalism (probably due to scientists no longer having a prescribed background in critical philosophy).

Hermann Helmholtz (19th-century): Even if we take the idealistic position, we can hardly talk about the lawful regularity of our sensations other than by saying: "Perceptions occur as if the things of the material world referred to in the realistic hypothesis actually did exist."

We cannot eliminate the "as if" construction completely, however, for we cannot consider the realistic interpretation to be more than an exceedingly useful and practical hypothesis. We cannot assert that it is necessarily true, for opposed to it there is always the possibility of other irrefutable idealistic hypotheses. It is always well to keep this in mind in order not to infer from the facts more than can rightly be inferred from them.

The various idealistic and realistic interpretations are metaphysical hypotheses which, as long as they are recognised as such, are scientifically completely justified. They may become dangerous, however, if they are presented as dogmas or as alleged necessities of thought. Science must consider thoroughly all admissible hypotheses in order to obtain a complete picture of all possible modes of explanation.

Furthermore, hypotheses are necessary to someone doing research, for one cannot always wait until a reliable scientific conclusion has been reached; one must sometimes make judgments according to either probability or aesthetic or moral feelings. Metaphysical hypotheses are not to be objected to here either. A thinker is unworthy of science, however, if he forgets the hypothetical origin of his assertions.

The arrogance and vehemence with which such hidden hypotheses are sometimes defended are usually the result of a lack of confidence which their advocates feel in the hidden depths of their minds about the qualifications of their claims. What we unquestionably can find as a fact, without any hypothetical element whatsoever, is the lawful regularity of phenomena. --The Facts Of Perception