Feb 21, 2026 01:56 AM
https://iai.tv/articles/the-quantum-worl..._auid=2020
INTRO: We assume that objects are more fundamental than the relationships between those objects. However, philosopher George Webster argues that quantum mechanics upends this common-sense picture. In the quantum world, relations like symmetry are more real than the particles themselves. But neither our everyday language, nor the language of logic favored by philosophers, can make sense of this. Webster suggests that we turn to the weird and wonderful language of Gilles Deleuze to truly comprehend the quantum picture of reality.
EXCERPTS: In the case of the coins, the fourfold probability distribution is explained partly by the fact that we can count a mixed result in two distinct ways: one coin displaying heads and the other displaying tails, and vice versa. Even though the coins may be the same denomination (e.g., both fifty-pence pieces), they are distinct objects and so exchanging them counts as a different physical state.
The quantum case, however, requires an alternative explanation. If exchanging our particles yields no observable or statistical difference (i.e., if our particles are “permutation invariant”), then we are forced to conclude that the exchanged states are in fact one and the same physical state. And though there are further steps in this interpretative story, an upshot that must be taken seriously is that exchanging elementary particles makes no difference because they are not distinct objects and so must be understood relationally. Some structural realists, for example, take this to show that what is fundamentally real are not particles as such, but rather the laws and symmetries (such as permutation invariance) that govern their behaviour.
[...] Deleuze argues that the concepts of difference and identity have been systematically misunderstood throughout the history of philosophy. Traditionally, difference is treated as derivative or secondary—as a relation of non-identity between already constituted identities or individuals. In other words, identity is logically and ontologically prior to difference because things differ only in virtue of their already established properties (as in our mountains example).
Deleuze argues that this picture should be inverted. On his account, difference is primary and identity is derivative. Objects do not come first and then differ; rather, objects emerge out of more fundamental processes of differentiation.
This reversal has profound consequences. It undercuts the very intuition that makes a relations-based metaphysics seem incoherent. But what motivates such a reversal? And what descriptive language, if not modern logic and set theory, can we employ to make sense of it? To answer these questions, we can turn to Deleuze’s engagements with science... (MORE - missing details)
INTRO: We assume that objects are more fundamental than the relationships between those objects. However, philosopher George Webster argues that quantum mechanics upends this common-sense picture. In the quantum world, relations like symmetry are more real than the particles themselves. But neither our everyday language, nor the language of logic favored by philosophers, can make sense of this. Webster suggests that we turn to the weird and wonderful language of Gilles Deleuze to truly comprehend the quantum picture of reality.
EXCERPTS: In the case of the coins, the fourfold probability distribution is explained partly by the fact that we can count a mixed result in two distinct ways: one coin displaying heads and the other displaying tails, and vice versa. Even though the coins may be the same denomination (e.g., both fifty-pence pieces), they are distinct objects and so exchanging them counts as a different physical state.
The quantum case, however, requires an alternative explanation. If exchanging our particles yields no observable or statistical difference (i.e., if our particles are “permutation invariant”), then we are forced to conclude that the exchanged states are in fact one and the same physical state. And though there are further steps in this interpretative story, an upshot that must be taken seriously is that exchanging elementary particles makes no difference because they are not distinct objects and so must be understood relationally. Some structural realists, for example, take this to show that what is fundamentally real are not particles as such, but rather the laws and symmetries (such as permutation invariance) that govern their behaviour.
[...] Deleuze argues that the concepts of difference and identity have been systematically misunderstood throughout the history of philosophy. Traditionally, difference is treated as derivative or secondary—as a relation of non-identity between already constituted identities or individuals. In other words, identity is logically and ontologically prior to difference because things differ only in virtue of their already established properties (as in our mountains example).
Deleuze argues that this picture should be inverted. On his account, difference is primary and identity is derivative. Objects do not come first and then differ; rather, objects emerge out of more fundamental processes of differentiation.
This reversal has profound consequences. It undercuts the very intuition that makes a relations-based metaphysics seem incoherent. But what motivates such a reversal? And what descriptive language, if not modern logic and set theory, can we employ to make sense of it? To answer these questions, we can turn to Deleuze’s engagements with science... (MORE - missing details)