Oct 12, 2024 08:33 PM
https://iai.tv/articles/why-stephen-hawk..._auid=2020
INTRO: In 2012 Stephen Hawking abandoned belief in the ability of science to describe reality, in favour of a model-dependent account of truth. We tend to think it is the job of scientists to discover truths about the universe. Yet, Hawking rendered this an impossible task and came to argue that truth is an illusion. For Hawking, in the end, there was no idea of reality that made any sense. All we have are our models.
EXCERPTS (Paul Hoyningen-Huene): . . . Because realism is so deeply ingrained in our common sense understanding of reality and the world, many people find the second alternative simply incoherent, i.e. the notion that reality consists additionally of mind-dependent elements. This view directly contradicts, for many people, what reality is, period. As it turns out however, both in philosophy and in physics, thinkers have been forced to take seriously non-realistic alternatives to this "realist" view...
[...] The articulation of non-realist positions faces two main challenges. The first is that defenders of realism will claim that any non-realist position rests on a self-misunderstanding. In truth, they contend, non-realists do not claim that reality itself has mind-dependent elements (which is absurd to realists), but only our views of reality. The latter is, of course, trivial since our views of reality are our own products, thus dependent on our minds. Therefore, the defenders of non-realist positions need to come up with good arguments against realism.
The second challenge for non-realists is to specify which ingredients of reality they claim to be mind-dependent, and to argue for their specific choice...
[...] After these preparatory general remarks, let us now turn to Hawking. He calls his position “model-dependent realism.” Note at once that realists in the sense developed above would deny Hawking’s position the title “realism” because he denies precisely the centerpiece of that realism, namely, that reality is completely free of mind-dependent ingredients. Instead, as the term indicates, Hawking seems to claim that reality is dependent on our models of it.
Regarding the first challenge to non-realists, how does Hawking argue against realism?
Hawking thinks that realism is a “naïve view of reality” that “is not compatible with modern physics”. His argument is first that “our brains interpret the input by our sensory organs by making a model of the world”. This implies that our perceived world is brain or mind dependent and therefore just a model of world – a different mind-brain would produce a different model.
In addition, when theorizing about that perceived world in physics, we build models of the unperceived entities that are behind the observable phenomena and generate them. However, there is usually more than one model or theory available for the same domain with the same predictive accuracy, but with different fundamental elements and concepts. We can use whichever model or theory is more convenient, and therefore “one cannot be said to be more real than the other”.
In the philosophy of science, this argument is known as “the underdetermination of scientific theories” and was first articulated in the early 20th century by the French physicist, historian, and philosopher of science Pierre Duhem. The result of this fundamental multiplicity of empirically adequate models is that for Hawking, “there is no picture- or theory independent concept of reality”.
It is now obvious what Hawking’s answer to the second challenge to non-realists was, namely, to specify the mind-dependent ingredients in reality: models or theories. Although terminologically not always very precise, he means by that “a model (generally of a mathematical nature) and a set of rules that connect the elements of the model to observations”. One must jettison therefore the classical picture of a reality as containing certain mind-independent objects with definite properties and relations, and of a science that tries to determine those objects, properties, and relations.
In philosophy of science, a very similar position was developed, since the 1960s, by physicist, historian, and philosopher of science Thomas S. Kuhn...
[...] However, I think that Hawking’s contribution to the debate is very valuable for two reasons. First, it adds a new variant to the family of non-realist positions that are in competition with one another regarding the precise nature of the mind-dependent ingredients of reality that supposedly do not attenuate the objectivity of objective reality. Second, it is important that such non-realist positions are not only developed by philosophers but also by physicists, who may be less under the suspicion of having utterly crazy ideas lacking all contact to reality.
I personally think that a thoroughly realist understanding of science is untenable for various reasons, Hawking’s reason being one of them, because it is too optimistic regarding the scope and depth of human cognitive faculties. This forces us to develop alternatives, and this process is well underway.
On some occasions, Hawking is even more radical than what we have outlined above. When he says that “it is pointless to ask whether a model is real, only whether it agrees with observation”, he means more than just relativizing the concept of reality to models. He dismisses the concept of reality altogether as doing no work in and for science.
So, in evaluating theories and models, Hawking urges us not to ask whether these theories or models represent reality (whatever that may mean exactly), but to get rid of the question altogether and only ask how well they agree with observation. This is in full concordance with what Hawking said in his 1996 debate with Roger Penrose: “I don’t demand that a theory correspond to reality because I don’t know what it is. […] All I’m concerned with is that the theory should predict the results of measurements” (p. 121 in Hawking and Penrose 1996).
This of course reinforces the impression that the label “model-dependent realism” is misleading because one would expect that such a position would enlighten us about the nature of reality, and not dismiss it as operationally useless... (MORE - missing details)
INTRO: In 2012 Stephen Hawking abandoned belief in the ability of science to describe reality, in favour of a model-dependent account of truth. We tend to think it is the job of scientists to discover truths about the universe. Yet, Hawking rendered this an impossible task and came to argue that truth is an illusion. For Hawking, in the end, there was no idea of reality that made any sense. All we have are our models.
EXCERPTS (Paul Hoyningen-Huene): . . . Because realism is so deeply ingrained in our common sense understanding of reality and the world, many people find the second alternative simply incoherent, i.e. the notion that reality consists additionally of mind-dependent elements. This view directly contradicts, for many people, what reality is, period. As it turns out however, both in philosophy and in physics, thinkers have been forced to take seriously non-realistic alternatives to this "realist" view...
[...] The articulation of non-realist positions faces two main challenges. The first is that defenders of realism will claim that any non-realist position rests on a self-misunderstanding. In truth, they contend, non-realists do not claim that reality itself has mind-dependent elements (which is absurd to realists), but only our views of reality. The latter is, of course, trivial since our views of reality are our own products, thus dependent on our minds. Therefore, the defenders of non-realist positions need to come up with good arguments against realism.
The second challenge for non-realists is to specify which ingredients of reality they claim to be mind-dependent, and to argue for their specific choice...
[...] After these preparatory general remarks, let us now turn to Hawking. He calls his position “model-dependent realism.” Note at once that realists in the sense developed above would deny Hawking’s position the title “realism” because he denies precisely the centerpiece of that realism, namely, that reality is completely free of mind-dependent ingredients. Instead, as the term indicates, Hawking seems to claim that reality is dependent on our models of it.
Regarding the first challenge to non-realists, how does Hawking argue against realism?
Hawking thinks that realism is a “naïve view of reality” that “is not compatible with modern physics”. His argument is first that “our brains interpret the input by our sensory organs by making a model of the world”. This implies that our perceived world is brain or mind dependent and therefore just a model of world – a different mind-brain would produce a different model.
In addition, when theorizing about that perceived world in physics, we build models of the unperceived entities that are behind the observable phenomena and generate them. However, there is usually more than one model or theory available for the same domain with the same predictive accuracy, but with different fundamental elements and concepts. We can use whichever model or theory is more convenient, and therefore “one cannot be said to be more real than the other”.
In the philosophy of science, this argument is known as “the underdetermination of scientific theories” and was first articulated in the early 20th century by the French physicist, historian, and philosopher of science Pierre Duhem. The result of this fundamental multiplicity of empirically adequate models is that for Hawking, “there is no picture- or theory independent concept of reality”.
It is now obvious what Hawking’s answer to the second challenge to non-realists was, namely, to specify the mind-dependent ingredients in reality: models or theories. Although terminologically not always very precise, he means by that “a model (generally of a mathematical nature) and a set of rules that connect the elements of the model to observations”. One must jettison therefore the classical picture of a reality as containing certain mind-independent objects with definite properties and relations, and of a science that tries to determine those objects, properties, and relations.
In philosophy of science, a very similar position was developed, since the 1960s, by physicist, historian, and philosopher of science Thomas S. Kuhn...
[...] However, I think that Hawking’s contribution to the debate is very valuable for two reasons. First, it adds a new variant to the family of non-realist positions that are in competition with one another regarding the precise nature of the mind-dependent ingredients of reality that supposedly do not attenuate the objectivity of objective reality. Second, it is important that such non-realist positions are not only developed by philosophers but also by physicists, who may be less under the suspicion of having utterly crazy ideas lacking all contact to reality.
I personally think that a thoroughly realist understanding of science is untenable for various reasons, Hawking’s reason being one of them, because it is too optimistic regarding the scope and depth of human cognitive faculties. This forces us to develop alternatives, and this process is well underway.
On some occasions, Hawking is even more radical than what we have outlined above. When he says that “it is pointless to ask whether a model is real, only whether it agrees with observation”, he means more than just relativizing the concept of reality to models. He dismisses the concept of reality altogether as doing no work in and for science.
So, in evaluating theories and models, Hawking urges us not to ask whether these theories or models represent reality (whatever that may mean exactly), but to get rid of the question altogether and only ask how well they agree with observation. This is in full concordance with what Hawking said in his 1996 debate with Roger Penrose: “I don’t demand that a theory correspond to reality because I don’t know what it is. […] All I’m concerned with is that the theory should predict the results of measurements” (p. 121 in Hawking and Penrose 1996).
This of course reinforces the impression that the label “model-dependent realism” is misleading because one would expect that such a position would enlighten us about the nature of reality, and not dismiss it as operationally useless... (MORE - missing details)