Aug 23, 2024 01:31 AM
https://iai.tv/articles/the-paradoxes-at..._auid=2020
INTRO: We believe things can’t be both true and false, it can’t be both raining and not raining at the same time. Philosopher Graham Priest, however, thinks differently. In this interview, he argues true contradictions are an intrinsic part of reality.
EXCERPT: In embracing paradoxes as real, what are the ontological commitments that follow? How does this impact your view of metaphysics, particularly regarding concepts like objecthood and identity?
I’m not sure there is anything much more to say about this. Since I am a dialetheist, I think that some objects are contradictory. That says nothing about their objecthood per se. Dialetheism does not, in itself, imply that identity is non-transitive. It is quite compatible with a standard view of identity. However, in one of my books I applied it to give a non-transitive theory of identity.
Mathematics and science are fields heavily reliant on consistency and non-contradiction. How do you see dialetheism affecting these domains? Are there areas where embracing paradoxes could lead to new insights or breakthroughs?
No, this is not true. First, we now know that there are coherent mathematical theories based on non-classical logics. Those based on a paraconsistent logic will be inconsistent. Moreover, inconsistent theories have been accepted by scientists. The most obvious example of this is classical dynamics. For about 200 years, this was based on the infinitesimal calculus, which was well known to be inconsistent. Scientists will accept whatever theory produces the right empirical results. If this is inconsistent, so be it. True, for the last 200 years scientists have not deliberately constructed inconsistent theories; but now that we have well-established non-classical mathematics, perhaps they will be.
If contradictions can be true, what does this mean for ethical reasoning and moral philosophy? Could there be true moral paradoxes, and if so, how should we navigate them?
Yes, there would appear to be normative dialetheias, where you ought to bring it about that something, and it is not the case that you ought to bring it about. If this is so, you just have to live with the contradiction, and take the consequences... (MORE - missing details)
INTRO: We believe things can’t be both true and false, it can’t be both raining and not raining at the same time. Philosopher Graham Priest, however, thinks differently. In this interview, he argues true contradictions are an intrinsic part of reality.
EXCERPT: In embracing paradoxes as real, what are the ontological commitments that follow? How does this impact your view of metaphysics, particularly regarding concepts like objecthood and identity?
I’m not sure there is anything much more to say about this. Since I am a dialetheist, I think that some objects are contradictory. That says nothing about their objecthood per se. Dialetheism does not, in itself, imply that identity is non-transitive. It is quite compatible with a standard view of identity. However, in one of my books I applied it to give a non-transitive theory of identity.
Mathematics and science are fields heavily reliant on consistency and non-contradiction. How do you see dialetheism affecting these domains? Are there areas where embracing paradoxes could lead to new insights or breakthroughs?
No, this is not true. First, we now know that there are coherent mathematical theories based on non-classical logics. Those based on a paraconsistent logic will be inconsistent. Moreover, inconsistent theories have been accepted by scientists. The most obvious example of this is classical dynamics. For about 200 years, this was based on the infinitesimal calculus, which was well known to be inconsistent. Scientists will accept whatever theory produces the right empirical results. If this is inconsistent, so be it. True, for the last 200 years scientists have not deliberately constructed inconsistent theories; but now that we have well-established non-classical mathematics, perhaps they will be.
If contradictions can be true, what does this mean for ethical reasoning and moral philosophy? Could there be true moral paradoxes, and if so, how should we navigate them?
Yes, there would appear to be normative dialetheias, where you ought to bring it about that something, and it is not the case that you ought to bring it about. If this is so, you just have to live with the contradiction, and take the consequences... (MORE - missing details)