Jul 31, 2024 05:46 PM
Why science will never explain consciousness
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/...sciousness
INTRO: This post was co-authored with Ralph Weir, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Lincoln. He is the author of "The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics: An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance" as well as academic articles on philosophy of mind, AI and human enhancement, metaphysics, and religion.
KEY POINTS: Phenomenal consciousness, unlike functional “consciousness,” isn’t definable in terms of physical processes. All science can do is correlate phenomenal consciousness with certain physical processes. Science can’t explain why these processes don’t operate “in the dark,” without phenomenal consciousness.
EXCERPTS: . . .It’s relatively easy to explain how an arrangement of particles could be functionally conscious. That’s because a “function” can be defined in wholly physical terms. It’s just about particles moving in particular ways in response to stimuli. It involves nothing more experiential than, say, an automatic door. For this reason, the term “functional consciousness” is a bit of a misnomer.
[...] If we’re looking for physical science to explain phenomenal consciousness rather than just observe the physical properties with which it’s correlated, we’re necessarily going to be disappointed. And here’s why.
If we want to explain why water is a liquid at room temperature, we can say [...] This explanation works because there’s a conceptual connection between the weakness of the hydrogen bonds and the macroscopic properties of liquidity, such as the way a liquid takes the shape of its container.
A physical explanation of phenomenal consciousness would require the same kind of conceptual connection between phenomenal consciousness and some physical activity. There would have to be some kind of particle movement that clearly could not happen without conscious experience. But no such conceptual connection exists.
That’s why, for example, a colorblind person can’t learn what it’s like to see color just by studying a textbook on the mechanisms of visual perception. And it’s why you can’t be certain from the physiology and behavior of other people whether colors look the same to them as to you... (MORE - details)
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I wouldn't necessarily say "never". It's remotely possible that a simulation of the brain or an AI model strictly modeled on such might have experiences in the future, and be able to report on them to humans. In that case, researchers could tweak its processing structure in various ways, and it could provide information about what internally happened in response (as well as generate images and audio of its private manifestations). Taking that data, some theorists might eventually devise a paradigm and metaphysics that integrated and tentatively explained the effects, eventually resulting in a science of phenomenal consciousness that could predict results.
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/...sciousness
INTRO: This post was co-authored with Ralph Weir, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Lincoln. He is the author of "The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics: An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance" as well as academic articles on philosophy of mind, AI and human enhancement, metaphysics, and religion.
KEY POINTS: Phenomenal consciousness, unlike functional “consciousness,” isn’t definable in terms of physical processes. All science can do is correlate phenomenal consciousness with certain physical processes. Science can’t explain why these processes don’t operate “in the dark,” without phenomenal consciousness.
EXCERPTS: . . .It’s relatively easy to explain how an arrangement of particles could be functionally conscious. That’s because a “function” can be defined in wholly physical terms. It’s just about particles moving in particular ways in response to stimuli. It involves nothing more experiential than, say, an automatic door. For this reason, the term “functional consciousness” is a bit of a misnomer.
[...] If we’re looking for physical science to explain phenomenal consciousness rather than just observe the physical properties with which it’s correlated, we’re necessarily going to be disappointed. And here’s why.
If we want to explain why water is a liquid at room temperature, we can say [...] This explanation works because there’s a conceptual connection between the weakness of the hydrogen bonds and the macroscopic properties of liquidity, such as the way a liquid takes the shape of its container.
A physical explanation of phenomenal consciousness would require the same kind of conceptual connection between phenomenal consciousness and some physical activity. There would have to be some kind of particle movement that clearly could not happen without conscious experience. But no such conceptual connection exists.
That’s why, for example, a colorblind person can’t learn what it’s like to see color just by studying a textbook on the mechanisms of visual perception. And it’s why you can’t be certain from the physiology and behavior of other people whether colors look the same to them as to you... (MORE - details)
- - - - - - - - - -
I wouldn't necessarily say "never". It's remotely possible that a simulation of the brain or an AI model strictly modeled on such might have experiences in the future, and be able to report on them to humans. In that case, researchers could tweak its processing structure in various ways, and it could provide information about what internally happened in response (as well as generate images and audio of its private manifestations). Taking that data, some theorists might eventually devise a paradigm and metaphysics that integrated and tentatively explained the effects, eventually resulting in a science of phenomenal consciousness that could predict results.