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Science is not the only form of knowledge, but it is the best
https://aeon.co/essays/science-is-not-th...s-the-best

INTRO: ‘Philosophy is dead,’ Stephen Hawking once declared, because it ‘has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics.’ It is scientists, not philosophers, who are now ‘the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge’.

The response from some philosophers was to accuse Hawking of ‘scientism’. The charge of ‘scientism’ is meant to convey disapproval of anyone who values scientific disciplines, such as physics, over non-scientific disciplines, such as philosophy. The philosopher Tom Sorell writes that scientism is ‘a matter of putting too high a value on science in comparison with other branches of learning or culture’.

But what’s wrong with putting a higher value on science compared with other academic disciplines? What is so bad about scientism? If physics is in fact a better torch in the quest for knowledge than philosophy, as Hawking claimed, then perhaps it should be valued over philosophy and other non-scientific fields of enquiry.

Before we can address these questions, however, we need to get our definitions straight. For, much like other philosophical -isms, ‘scientism’ means different things to different philosophers. Now, the question of whether science is the only way of knowing about reality, or at least better than non-scientific ways of knowing, is an epistemological question.

Construed as an epistemological thesis, then, scientism can be broadly understood as either the view that scientific knowledge is the only form of knowledge we have, or the view that scientific knowledge is the best form of knowledge we have. But scientism comes in other varieties as well, including methodological and metaphysical ones.

As a methodological thesis, scientism is either the view that scientific methods are the only ways of knowing about reality we have, or the view that scientific methods are the best ways of knowing about reality we have. And, construed as a metaphysical thesis, scientism is either the view that science is our only guide to what exists, or the view that science is our best guide to what exists.

Without a clear understanding of the aforementioned varieties of scientism, philosophical parties to the scientism debate are at risk of merely talking past each other. That is, some defenders of scientism might be arguing for weaker varieties of scientism, in terms of scientific knowledge or methods being the best ones, while their opponents interpret them as arguing for stronger varieties of scientism, in terms of scientific knowledge or methods being the only ones.

My own position, for example, is a weak variety of scientism. In my paper ‘What’s So Bad about Scientism?’ (2017), I defend scientism as an epistemological thesis, which I call ‘Weak Scientism’. This is the view that scientific knowledge is the best form of knowledge we have (as opposed to ‘Strong Scientism’, which is the view that scientific knowledge is the only knowledge we have)... (MORE - details)
(May 13, 2023 07:16 PM)C C Wrote: [ -> ]The charge of ‘scientism’ is meant to convey disapproval of anyone who values scientific disciplines, such as physics, over non-scientific disciplines, such as philosophy.
No, it's not. Maybe by navel-gazing philosophers who feel insecure about their own field, but not in general.

Quote:The philosopher Tom Sorell writes that scientism is ‘a matter of putting too high a value on science in comparison with other branches of learning or culture’.
He's wrong. It doesn't matter what people may choose to value. Scientism is, specifically, using science to make predictions not based in empiricism. Like the claim that "science will prove God doesn't exist." There's nothing wrong with valuing and believing in the power of science. There is something wrong with misusing science to make claims science cannot support.

Quote:But what’s wrong with putting a higher value on science compared with other academic disciplines?
Nothing at all. But as a criticism of the accusation of scientism, it's just a straw man.

Quote:What is so bad about scientism? If physics is in fact a better torch in the quest for knowledge than philosophy, as Hawking claimed, then perhaps it should be valued over philosophy and other non-scientific fields of enquiry.
This is obvious equivocating. And the author seems to be somewhat aware of this, as he then tries to define various kinds of scientism...while somehow never defining the one actually used in most cases.
Coincidentally my quote of the day addresses this same problem with scientism, or maybe even science itself, at least when it comes to providing a meaningful worldview...

“One cannot ignore half of life for the purposes of science, and then claim that the results of science give a full and adequate picture of the meaning of life. All discussions of 'life' which begin with a description of man's place on a speck of matter in space, in an endless evolutionary scale, are bound to be half-measures, because they leave out most of the experiences which are important to us as human beings.”
― Colin Wilson, Religion and the Rebel
(May 13, 2023 07:16 PM)C C Wrote: [ -> ]Science is not the only form of knowledge, but it is the best
https://aeon.co/essays/science-is-not-th...s-the-best

INTRO: ‘Philosophy is dead,’ Stephen Hawking once declared, because it ‘has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics.’

"Kept up" how? Physics doesn't seem to even be relevant to many philosophical specialties. Even if we restrict discussion to the philosophy of science, I'm not sure how relevant Hawking's own theoretical physics is to many of the questions philosophers of biology address, from the nature of life itself, through all kinds of questions about evolution, teleology, natural kinds and taxonomy.

Quote:It is scientists, not philosophers, who are now ‘the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge’.

I'll believe that when physicists can explain (in an uncircular manner) the origin of the "laws of physics" and why those "laws" take the form that they seemingly do. I'd like to hear them explain what mathematics and logic are and why physical reality seems to behave in accordance with them.

This illustrates what I take philosophy to be, and why it seems to me to be immune from the kind of criticism that Mizrahi (himself a philosopher of science, who is seemingly suffering from a case of physics-envy) levels at it.

Philosophy isn't trying to compete with physics in offering mathematical descriptions of how various items of sensory experience relate. Instead, philosophy asks what the items of sensory experience are, what the relations, logical and mathematical forms that seemingly apply in physics are, and how human beings, subject to all of the limitations of the human condition, can know any of these things.

Put another way, philosophy isn't trying to do the same tasks as physics. Instead, it inquires into the conceptual vocabulary of physics and into the implicit assumptions that physicists learn in graduate school (as they learn how to practice physics) and rarely if ever question later.

Quote:The response from some philosophers was to accuse Hawking of ‘scientism’... But what’s wrong with putting a higher value on science compared with other academic disciplines? What is so bad about scientism?

Apart from it being self-contradictory? The concepts of 'wrong', 'bad' and 'value' aren't scientific concepts, are they? They certainly don't seem to derive from Hawking's physics. So Mizrahi has to step outside the scientism he is defending to even pose his question: "What's so bad about scientism", let alone to provide any answer to it.

Quote:If physics is in fact a better torch in the quest for knowledge than philosophy, as Hawking claimed, then perhaps it should be valued over philosophy and other non-scientific fields of enquiry.

Sure, but that's an awfully big "IF" there.

Science is just a particular conceptual vocabulary (actually several, since biologists don't typically make much use of the concepts of physics) and a huge and diverse set of often poorly justified procedures (laboratory procedures, mathematical methods, ways of conceptualizing problems and the path to solving them, etc.), used to address a very limited set of questions that don't even begin to exhaust the issues and the questions that life throws at us.

The idea that physics can provide solutions to all questions seems to presuppose at the very least, a hard-reductionism that will be very hard to justify.

Quote:Before we can address these questions, however, we need to get our definitions straight. For, much like other philosophical -isms, ‘scientism’ means different things to different philosophers. Now, the question of whether science is the only way of knowing about reality, or at least better than non-scientific ways of knowing, is an epistemological question.

Construed as an epistemological thesis, then, scientism can be broadly understood as either the view that scientific knowledge is the only form of knowledge we have, or the view that scientific knowledge is the best form of knowledge we have. But scientism comes in other varieties as well, including methodological and metaphysical ones.

As a methodological thesis, scientism is either the view that scientific methods are the only ways of knowing about reality we have, or the view that scientific methods are the best ways of knowing about reality we have. And, construed as a metaphysical thesis, scientism is either the view that science is our only guide to what exists, or the view that science is our best guide to what exists.

How can a proponent of scientism even talk about epistemology or metaphysics? That would seem to be straying far outside the boundaries of science into the allegedly inferior realms of philosophy.

Quote:Without a clear understanding of the aforementioned varieties of scientism, philosophical parties to the scientism debate are at risk of merely talking past each other. That is, some defenders of scientism might be arguing for weaker varieties of scientism, in terms of scientific knowledge or methods being the best ones, while their opponents interpret them as arguing for stronger varieties of scientism, in terms of scientific knowledge or methods being the only ones.

That seems like a distinction without a difference to me. If we announce that scientific knowledge and methods are the best ones, that seems dangerously close to slipping in the assumption that science is better than philosophy (or any other human cognitive activity) across the board, applied to all questions that arise in life.

If we read it differently, to merely be saying that particular sciences are better than anything else at answering questions that arise in the practice of that particular science, without covertly trying to broaden that out to all questions whatsoever, then it risks becoming trivial. Of course molecular biologists will be best at answering molecular biology questions. Has any critic of scientism ever disputed that?

Quote:My own position, for example, is a weak variety of scientism. In my paper ‘What’s So Bad about Scientism?’ (2017), I defend scientism as an epistemological thesis, which I call ‘Weak Scientism’. This is the view that scientific knowledge is the best form of knowledge we have (as opposed to ‘Strong Scientism’, which is the view that scientific knowledge is the only knowledge we have)... (MORE - details)

Perhaps the primary issue that I have with what Mizrahi is saying about his "weak scientism" isn't his use of the non-scientific value judgement "best", so much as it is a matter of applicability of scientific concepts and methods far beyond the scope of the sciences where the concepts and methods originated. If Mizrahi is claiming that scientific methods and concepts are "best" in all human cognitive pursuits, then he is plopping for a variety of strong scientism, not the weak scientism he claims he's championing. But if he's claiming that scientific methods and concepts are "best" only within the bounds of the particular scientific specialty that gave rise to them, then his whole thesis threatens to become trivial.

I haven't read his paper (or his book on the same subject) but I'd like to see how he gets out of that little problem.
(May 14, 2023 11:43 PM)Yazata Wrote: [ -> ]If we read it differently, to merely be saying that particular sciences are better than anything else at answering questions that arise in the practice of that particular science, without covertly trying to broaden that out to all questions whatsoever, then it risks becoming trivial.

That's the entire problem with scientism. It's ultracrepidarian...people trying to apply their knowledge of a specific field to questions that have no tangible reference to said field. Neil deGrasse Tyson is one of the most prolific purveyors.