Mar 9, 2022 05:58 PM
https://iai.tv/articles/looking-at-genes...-auid-2067
EXCERPTS: . . . This tension arises because biology straddles what the biologist-cum-philosopher Massimo Pigliucci called the ‘teleonomic divide’. Teleonomy, as opposed to teleology, is the appearance of purpose. Biologists do not literally believe purpose actually exists or that living organisms are made of any mystical substance absent in non-living things. They are good materialists – no ghost in the machine here.
But biology clearly is different from physics and chemistry. The short and obvious answer to why it is different is that biologists study life. Living organisms are, of course, just like any physical object. They are built with the same protons and electrons as non-living things and are subject to the same laws of nature. Still, organisms also possess something that makes a racoon different from a rock. Racoons and other animals seem to have a sort of goal-directedness that the rock does not.
Unlike physicists and chemists (but just like economists and historians), biologists occasionally express their explanations in terms of purpose, goals, and strategies. We justify this by pointing to the unique achievement of Charles Darwin. With the theory of evolution by natural selection, he showed how a strictly mechanistic process of inheritance and reproduction can result in the appearance of design in nature: whether the polar bear’s fur that makes it blend into its surroundings or the flowers of the orchid that mimic female bees to attract males to pollinate them. Explaining the fact that organisms often appear almost perfectly suited for their environment – what we call adaptations – is a crowning achievement of Darwin’s theory and why it provides an explanatory bridge between mechanism and purpose.
This process of evolution by natural selection is the reason why it is allowed in biology to talk about purpose, to think in terms of intentions, to anthropomorphize. By couching such talk in terms of entities trying to maximize their fitness, purpose explanations can be brought into the realm of scientific explanations.
Not all ways of anthropomorphising are created equal, however. For example, there is a long tradition of personifying the process of natural selection itself. Darwin, drawing on the parallels between the choices made by a breeder and the operation of natural selection, often used this anthropomorphic way of thinking. The problem with those parallels is the crucial difference between artificial and natural selection: the former has foresight, which the latter lacks. Evolution has no pre-determined goal.
Another form of anthropomorphizing is to think of biological entities as agents with goals. The typical agent is an individual organism, and it may seem like the best application of anthropomorphic thinking is to the organisms most like us, such as chimps and gorillas. In fact, the opposite is true: anthropomorphic thinking is most useful when thinking about entities totally different to us. To see why, let’s return to Hanke’s frustration.
[...] the so-called gene’s-eye view of evolution. It combines population genetics with a form of agential thinking inherited from the study of animal behaviour. The gene’s-eye view talks about genes in the same way we would talk about animals, as strategists pursuing their own goals. That is why it has also been known as selfish gene thinking as the selfish goal of each and every gene is to make it to the next generation.
[...] A licensed anthropomorphism gives you the best of both worlds. It is an approach that brings together the creative power of anthropomorphic approaches like the gene’s-eye view with the rigidity of mathematical modelling. Formal modelling of an argument does more than just put it on more sound footing: it often reveals hidden assumptions that verbal models obscure and lead us to novel, unexpected results.... (MORE - missing details)
EXCERPTS: . . . This tension arises because biology straddles what the biologist-cum-philosopher Massimo Pigliucci called the ‘teleonomic divide’. Teleonomy, as opposed to teleology, is the appearance of purpose. Biologists do not literally believe purpose actually exists or that living organisms are made of any mystical substance absent in non-living things. They are good materialists – no ghost in the machine here.
But biology clearly is different from physics and chemistry. The short and obvious answer to why it is different is that biologists study life. Living organisms are, of course, just like any physical object. They are built with the same protons and electrons as non-living things and are subject to the same laws of nature. Still, organisms also possess something that makes a racoon different from a rock. Racoons and other animals seem to have a sort of goal-directedness that the rock does not.
Unlike physicists and chemists (but just like economists and historians), biologists occasionally express their explanations in terms of purpose, goals, and strategies. We justify this by pointing to the unique achievement of Charles Darwin. With the theory of evolution by natural selection, he showed how a strictly mechanistic process of inheritance and reproduction can result in the appearance of design in nature: whether the polar bear’s fur that makes it blend into its surroundings or the flowers of the orchid that mimic female bees to attract males to pollinate them. Explaining the fact that organisms often appear almost perfectly suited for their environment – what we call adaptations – is a crowning achievement of Darwin’s theory and why it provides an explanatory bridge between mechanism and purpose.
This process of evolution by natural selection is the reason why it is allowed in biology to talk about purpose, to think in terms of intentions, to anthropomorphize. By couching such talk in terms of entities trying to maximize their fitness, purpose explanations can be brought into the realm of scientific explanations.
Not all ways of anthropomorphising are created equal, however. For example, there is a long tradition of personifying the process of natural selection itself. Darwin, drawing on the parallels between the choices made by a breeder and the operation of natural selection, often used this anthropomorphic way of thinking. The problem with those parallels is the crucial difference between artificial and natural selection: the former has foresight, which the latter lacks. Evolution has no pre-determined goal.
Another form of anthropomorphizing is to think of biological entities as agents with goals. The typical agent is an individual organism, and it may seem like the best application of anthropomorphic thinking is to the organisms most like us, such as chimps and gorillas. In fact, the opposite is true: anthropomorphic thinking is most useful when thinking about entities totally different to us. To see why, let’s return to Hanke’s frustration.
[...] the so-called gene’s-eye view of evolution. It combines population genetics with a form of agential thinking inherited from the study of animal behaviour. The gene’s-eye view talks about genes in the same way we would talk about animals, as strategists pursuing their own goals. That is why it has also been known as selfish gene thinking as the selfish goal of each and every gene is to make it to the next generation.
[...] A licensed anthropomorphism gives you the best of both worlds. It is an approach that brings together the creative power of anthropomorphic approaches like the gene’s-eye view with the rigidity of mathematical modelling. Formal modelling of an argument does more than just put it on more sound footing: it often reveals hidden assumptions that verbal models obscure and lead us to novel, unexpected results.... (MORE - missing details)