Aug 12, 2021 02:52 AM
https://www.psypost.org/2021/08/conspira...iews-61675
EXCERPTS: A study published in Applied Cognitive Psychology sheds light on how a person’s worldview can lead them to jump to erroneous conclusions in domains that correspond to these views. The researchers found that greater conspiracy belief was associated with increased susceptibility to making logical errors in the context of coronavirus conspiracies, and greater religiosity was tied to increased susceptibility to logical errors in the context of miraculous healings.
The study, led by Albert Wabnegger, specifically focused on the conjunction fallacy, a logical fallacy that presumes that a combination of events is more probable than a single event. Conjunction fallacies were first described by Tversky and Kahneman in 1982, following a study that began with participants reading a description of a woman named Linda who was passionate about social justice. Most participants evaluated the statement “Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement” as more probable than “Linda is a bank teller” — without knowing Linda’s job title or position on feminist issues. According to probability theory, two events (being a bank teller + being active in the feminist movement) cannot be more probable than a single event (being a bank teller).
[...] Wabnegger and colleagues theorize that when people with a particular world view — such as a conspiracy mindset — are met with information that corresponds to this view, they are quicker to draw conclusions about the information but more likely to make errors. Favoring a conclusion that fits their preconceptions, they ignore basic probability laws or the need for additional evidence.
Furthermore, studies suggest that religious people and conspiracy supporters tend to have a lower tolerance for randomness and a greater tendency to detect meaningful patterns out of random stimuli. Perceiving two distinct occurrences as more probable than one alone may reflect these individuals’ readiness to discern patterns out of randomness as a way of coping with uncertainty.
The authors note that their study cannot inform whether proneness to conjunction errors is a cause of religiosity/conspiracy belief, or whether it might be a response to such belief. They say a follow-up study with a longitudinal design would offer further insight... (MORE - missing details)
- - - - - -
Sounds like there's a little in common with the ideological preconceptions, statistical fallacies, and motivated reasoning of scientists themselves, working in the human disciplines.
https://www.scivillage.com/forum-88.html
EXCERPTS: A study published in Applied Cognitive Psychology sheds light on how a person’s worldview can lead them to jump to erroneous conclusions in domains that correspond to these views. The researchers found that greater conspiracy belief was associated with increased susceptibility to making logical errors in the context of coronavirus conspiracies, and greater religiosity was tied to increased susceptibility to logical errors in the context of miraculous healings.
The study, led by Albert Wabnegger, specifically focused on the conjunction fallacy, a logical fallacy that presumes that a combination of events is more probable than a single event. Conjunction fallacies were first described by Tversky and Kahneman in 1982, following a study that began with participants reading a description of a woman named Linda who was passionate about social justice. Most participants evaluated the statement “Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement” as more probable than “Linda is a bank teller” — without knowing Linda’s job title or position on feminist issues. According to probability theory, two events (being a bank teller + being active in the feminist movement) cannot be more probable than a single event (being a bank teller).
[...] Wabnegger and colleagues theorize that when people with a particular world view — such as a conspiracy mindset — are met with information that corresponds to this view, they are quicker to draw conclusions about the information but more likely to make errors. Favoring a conclusion that fits their preconceptions, they ignore basic probability laws or the need for additional evidence.
Furthermore, studies suggest that religious people and conspiracy supporters tend to have a lower tolerance for randomness and a greater tendency to detect meaningful patterns out of random stimuli. Perceiving two distinct occurrences as more probable than one alone may reflect these individuals’ readiness to discern patterns out of randomness as a way of coping with uncertainty.
The authors note that their study cannot inform whether proneness to conjunction errors is a cause of religiosity/conspiracy belief, or whether it might be a response to such belief. They say a follow-up study with a longitudinal design would offer further insight... (MORE - missing details)
- - - - - -
Sounds like there's a little in common with the ideological preconceptions, statistical fallacies, and motivated reasoning of scientists themselves, working in the human disciplines.
https://www.scivillage.com/forum-88.html
